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Markets, where buyers and sellers can exchange goods and services, are key to 
the division of labor, specialisation, the realisation of economies of scale and 
scope and, therefore, economic prosperity, growth and development. The bet-
ter markets work the easier it is to reap the benefits of specialisation and the 
gains from trade and voluntary exchange. For the emergence of market ex-
change, in turn, stable and secure property rights are crucial. These rights 
should be defined as clearly as possible and be as stable and secure as possible, 
in order to foster investment and to incentivize the careful and diligent treat-
ment of assets. Hence, the rule of law and secure property rights go hand in 
hand with the emergence of markets, gains from trade and economic growth 
and prosperity. 
Introduction 
The emergence of modern law has been a prerequisite for the development of 
modern markets, in which buyers and sellers can trade on a more or less anon-
ymous basis, without taking undue advantage of one another. While historical-
ly trade has often been organized through non-market forms, as Karl Polanyi 
(1944) has famously pointed-out, we have seen a development from (1) cere-
monial gift exchange over (2) simple barter trade to (3) personalized trading 
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relationships and (4) anonymous markets.1 This development has not only been 
facilitated by technological progress, but – to a large degree – by institutional 
change, i.e. the development of law and property rights. As Douglass North 
has pointed out in his discussion of Karl Polanyi:  
“An essential pre-condition for price-making markets is the existence of well-defined 
and enforced property rights over the good or service to be exchanged (…) The costs of 
defining and enforcing property rights – transaction costs – lead to non-price alloca-
tion of many goods and services today.”2 
In his theory of institutional change, North (1981) has analyzed how markets 
develop, depending on the size of societies and the costs of transport (which 
allows trade over long distances). More precisely, North (1981) has argued that 
exchange can take place without formal institutions such as property rights, as 
long as societies are of small size (families, tribes, villages…). In these socie-
ties, trade is guided and structured by informal rules. If, however, trade occurs 
over longer distances, institutions must be found to protect against what econ-
omists call opportunism, i.e. fraud and deceit. Institutions such as norms, 
measures and weights as well as money as a medium of exchange have basically 
developed in order to lower the costs of market exchange. Finally, urbanization 
and globalization require further institutional developments to facilitate trade 
(protection of property rights, international arbitration, diverse screening and 
signaling mechanisms). Coase has argued in a similar fashion:  
“When the facilities are scattered and owned by a vast number of people with very 
different interests (...) the establishment of a private legal system would be very diffi-
cult. Those operating in these markets have to depend, therefore, on the legal system 
of the State.”3 
In this paper, we elaborate on the interdependence between property rights, 
the rule of law and the development of market-based exchange that facilitates 
the division of labor and according productivity gains which, in turn, foster 
economic growth and prosperity. For that purpose, we first elaborate on the 
role of markets in the economics literature in section 2. As we will see, eco-
nomic theory has only perfunctorily dealt with the question of how markets 
emerge and how they are organised, even though markets play a major role in 
                                                     
1 See Salisbury (1968), 122. 
2 North (1977), 710. 
3 Coase (1988a), 10. 
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most economic systems. In section 3, the historical development how trade was 
organized over time is outlined in a very brief manner, before section 4 analyz-
es the institutional and informational requirements for modern markets to 
work. Section 5 then explains how the rule of law facilitates market exchange, 
before section 6 summarises and concludes. 
Markets in the Economics Literature 
In neoclassical economics exchange is simply assumed to take place if there are 
benefits from trade to be realised. The question of how markets are actually 
organised has usually been neglected. Instead, two fictions have, by and large, 
been used to model the exchange process in the simple world of zero transac-
tion costs. Either a (costlessly working) Walrasian auctioneer is supposed to 
postulate prices until demand equals supply, or individuals bargain about how 
to split the gains from trade and exchange goods along a so-called contract 
curve in an Edgeworth box. 
However, as Ronald Coase has made clear, an “elaborate analysis of individ-
uals exchanging nuts for apples on the edge of the forest”4 is inappropriate to 
approach real world markets, since it completely ignores the social institutions 
facilitating exchange. While traditional, neoclassical economics basically de-
termines the gains from trade and their distribution, it fails to show how much 
trade there is of which goods. The preconditions that facilitate trade are com-
pletely neglected. Put differently, the market is just assumed to be “there”. In 
contrast to neoclassical economics, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
does not take an economy’s institutional structure for granted, but aims at 
explaining why certain institutions such as a particular market exist. 
Drawing upon the analysis of Coase (1937), a major focus of the NIE has 
been placed on the so called theory of the firm which explains under which 
conditions transactions are organised within firms, or more generally, within 
hierarchies and not carried out as price intermediated market transactions. The 
primary focus of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) as developed by Oliver 
Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996) has been on the explanation of hierarchies 
within markets in terms of relative efficiency. From a transaction cost perspec-
                                                     
4 Coase (1988a), 8. 
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tive markets and hierarchies can be simply viewed as alternative governance 
structures to organise economic transactions. 
Markets and hierarchies are not only seen as alternative governance modes 
though, but markets are typically viewed as the “natural” form of economic 
organization. Only if the costs of using the price mechanism exceed the costs of 
internal organization, transactions are moved from the market to the firm. In 
these cases, “market failure” can be overcome by other explicit or implicit con-
tractual arrangements. As Oliver Williamson has admitted, “only as market-
mediated contracts break down are the transactions in question removed from 
markets and organized internally. The presumption that ‘in the beginning 
there were markets’ informs this perspective.”5 Similarly, Coase found that in 
the absence of transaction costs “the firm has no purpose”.6 
Accounting for the fact that carrying out and organising transactions is a 
costly activity in itself, neither the use of markets nor the organisation of firms 
is costless. In general, to facilitate transactions three kinds of transaction costs 
are involved: 
- information and search costs such as advertising costs or the cost of compar-
ing prices, 
- bargaining and contract negotiation costs, and 
- monitoring and contract enforcement costs.7 
One of the main hypotheses of the NIE, and the TCE framework in particular, 
is that in competitive environments transactions are organised in the most 
efficient way that minimises the transaction costs for a given transaction. Put 
differently, competition will lead to the emergence of the most efficient mode 
of organisation for every transaction. From this perspective, the crucial differ-
ence between markets and hierarchies consists in the way transactions are gov-
erned: Within firms the residual decision rights have been transferred to the 
firm’s owner or manager, so that transactions are based on authority and com-
mand, whereas on markets property rights are voluntarily transferred, and 
transactions are price intermediated. Again, from a transaction cost perspective 
markets and hierarchies are basically viewed as different governance structures 
to solve the same problem – how to organise exchange. 
                                                     
5 Williamson (1985), 87. 
6 Coase (1988b), 34. 
7 See Williamson (1989). 
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In addition to these two polar governance structures there exists a wide 
range of hybrid modes of organisations as, for example, franchise contracts.8 
Moreover, reasonably complex forms of governance, such as networks of rela-
tional contracts, may evolve to overcome coordination and cooperation prob-
lems. Ostrom (2010) has spoken about “polycentric governance of complex 
economic systems”. In this context, a major hypothesis of institutional eco-
nomic analysis is that because of “the filter of competition” only those contrac-
tual arrangements prevail that economise on transaction costs,9 or, as Oliver 
Williamson has put it, “the economic institutions of capitalism have the main 
purpose and effect of economising on transaction costs.”10 In this sense Coase 
has explained that “markets are institutions to facilitate exchange, that is, they 
exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying out exchange transactions.”11 
From an anthropological or historical perspective, however, the view that 
markets are the “natural” mode of economic organization is rather flawed. In 
primitive societies exchange has been organized in network structures, if not 
hierarchies, and exchange relations have been highly personalized.12 Impersonal 
spot markets, on the contrary, are a rather recent phenomenon.13 One of the 
few economists who acknowledges this fact is Douglass North who wrote: “All 
of the modern neoclassical literature discusses the firm as a substitute for the 
market. For the economic historian this perspective is useful; its usefulness is 
limited, however, because it ignores a crucial fact of history: Hierarchical or-
ganization forms and contractual arrangements in exchange predate the price-
making market.”14 
In contrast to Williamson one might therefore say that “in the beginning 
there were hierarchies” and, with respect to Coase, that in the absence of posi-
tive transaction costs the market has no purpose. Nevertheless, in economic 
theory the evolution of markets has not caught much attention: While the 
                                                     
8 See Klein (1980), Dnes (1996) and Menard (1995). 
9 See Alchian (1950). 
10 Williamson (1985), 17. 
11 Coase (1988a), 7. 
12 See Landa (1994). 
13 Salisbury (1968). 
14 North (1981), 41. 
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institutional economics literature claims to analyse the emergence of different 
institutions and their relative efficiency, surprisingly little attention has been 
paid to the development of markets and the conditions that enable markets to 
evolve.15 After all, one can hardly disagree with Coase who notes that “in mod-
ern economic theory the market itself has an even more shadowy role than the 
firm”.16 Similarly, Spulber noted that  
“firms establish and operate most markets by setting prices, carrying out transactions, 
forming and monitoring contracts, and producing and distributing information. Firms 
create and manage markets by acting as intermediaries between buyers and sellers.”17 
And furthermore, “just as producing and services consumes resources, so does the 
establishment and operation of markets to allocate those goods and services. (...) The 
market institutions that provide intermediation have not been given the attention they 
deserve.”  
In fact, the rise of many online platforms vividly demonstrates this fact: Firms 
organize and manage markets, markets are not simply “there”. 
The tendency to neglect market emergence and development in economic 
theory might be partially due to the influential work of Hayek who used the 
market as the standard example for a spontaneously emerging order (Hayek, 
1944, 1960). From an anthropological or historical point of view, however, 
this perspective is misleading, and quite the opposite seems to be true. Neither 
do markets arise spontaneously nor are they simply “there”. To explain their 
emergence is part of the challenge posed by Karl Polanyi (1944, 1957) as ex-
pressed by North (1977). How can the emergence of market-based exchange 
by explained and how can other forms of exchange such as reciprocity and dis-
tribution be explained by economic theory? 
A very, very brief History of Trade 
In fact, price-making markets in which the identity of the trading partners is 
irrelevant are a rather modern phenomenon. In early human history as well as 
in primitive societies exchange usually first took the form of ceremonial gift 
                                                     
15 See North (1994). 
16 Coase (1988a), 7; also see North (1977). 
17 Spulber (1996), 135–136. 
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giving. As Polanyi noted, “over millennia trade between empires was carried 
out as gift trade.”18 Publicly presented gifts constituted trade in so far as the 
gifts were expected to be reciprocated. In his famous Essai sur le don, Marcel 
Mauss (1925/1967) has stressed the reciprocal nature of gifts. In primitive 
societies virtually every exchange and contract took the form of a gift, which 
is, according to Mauss, only voluntary in theory, but obligatory in practice.19 
By the presentation of a gift an obligation to return a countergift was created. 
As Mauss furthermore explained, although the presentations commonly take 
the form of generous gifts, the transactions were “based on obligation and eco-
nomic self-interest.”20 What is also quite interesting to notice, is that exchange 
in primitive societies hardly ever occurred on an individual basis, but almost 
always between collective groups such as tribes, clans or families. 
In this context, the institution that has probably caught the most wide-
spread attention among economic anthropologists is the Kula Ring of Papua 
New Guinea. Since its detailed description by Malinowski it serves as the clas-
sical example of ceremonial gift exchange in the anthropological literature. 
The Kula Ring is a system of gift exchanges between several tribal societies 
that live on the different islands in the Western Pacific. Malinowski describes 
the trading system between these “stateless” societies as follows:  
“The Kula trade consists in a series of ... periodic overseas expeditions which link to-
gether the various islands groups, and annually bring back big quantities of vaygu’a 
and of subsidiary trade from one district to another. The trade is used up, but the 
vaygu’a - the armshells and the necklaces - go round and round the ring.”21  
The so-called vaygu’a are two different valuable goods, necklaces and arm-
bands, that permanently circulate in opposite directions. Their exchange is 
highly ceremonial and strictly regulated by a detailed set of rules. The basic 
purpose of the Kula exchange is not the ceremonial gift giving per se, but 
rather to facilitate peaceful commercial trade of useful commodities. Aside 
from the ceremonial gift exchange commercial goods are exchanged by mem-
bers of different tribes through a chain of intermediaries. Each Kula partner is 
not only involved in the ceremonial gift exchange, but also in commercial 
                                                     
18 Polanyi (1957), 262. 
19 Mauss (1925/1967), 1. 
20 Mauss (1925/1967), 1. 
21 Malinowski (1922/1953), 103. 
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trade with local residents and even with strangers “with whom an indirect 
exchange is carried on through the intermediation of the local men.”22 The 
Kula trade does not take place in the form of spot transactions, but is based on 
the principle of delayed reciprocity. As Landa has explained:  
“No Kula valuables are carried on overseas Kula expeditions; the visiting Kula partner 
visits his host to receive gifts and not to give them.”23 
Similarly, Mauss argued:  
“The rule is to set out with nothing to exchange or even to give in return for food (...) 
On these visits one is recipient only, and it is when the visiting tribes the following 
year become the hosts that gifts are repaid with interest.”24 The fact that the gifts 
received are usually even returned with interest payments, lead Mauss to the conclu-
sion that “economic evolution has not gone from barter to sale and from cash to credit. 
Barter arose from the system of gifts given and received on credit (...) Likewise pur-
chase and sale - both direct sale and credit sale - and the loan, derive from the same 
source.”25 
After all, the Kula exchange is not an anonymous exchange between atomized 
agents as it appears in neoclassical economics. Rather trading partners have to 
be member of the Kula ring, entry to which is strictly limited. As Belshaw 
explained  
“to enter the Kula ring a man must have the knowledge of the appropriate etiquette 
(...) Knowledge of the etiquette is attained through general socialization, but much of 
the magic is idiosyncratic and must be learned specifically (...) The exchanges are ac-
companied by forms of words and ceremonial acts all of which reinforce the notions of 
honorable gift-giving and mutual dependence between persons who, in most instances, 
would be strangers in other circumstances.”26 
The ritual aspects of the Kula exchange can be seen as “institutional ways of 
establishing individual and group identity in a world characterized by uncer-
tainty and high information costs”.27 Moreover, the ring structure of the Kula 
system as well as the fact that two different ceremonial goods flow in different 
                                                     
22 Malinowski (1922/1953), 363. 
23 Landa (1994), 148. 
24 Mauss (1925/1967), 20. 
25 Mauss (1954), 35. 
26 Belshaw (1965), 12. 
27 Landa (1994), 144. 
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directions can also be explained by transaction cost considerations. As Landa 
argued, “the Kula Ring is an institutional arrangement that emerged primarily 
in order to economize on transaction costs of intertribal commercial exchange 
in stateless societies. (...) In a society that lacks that institutions for protecting 
life, property, and contracts, an institution like the Kula Ring may be inter-
preted as a club-like arrangement for economizing on costs of transacting 
across tribal boundaries.”28 In a similar way, Ziegler (1990) traced the struc-
ture of the Kula system back to advantages of peaceful commercial trade. Ac-
cording to his analysis, the ceremonial gift exchange acts as an efficient and 
reliable signalling mechanism to facilitate commercial trade and to maintain 
the social order.29  
One might think that the Kula Ring is a rather singular phenomenon. 
However, quite on the contrary trade via mutual gift exchange has been the 
rule rather than the exception in primitive societies. To give another example, 
let us follow Mauss:  
“A relationship analogous to the Kula is that of the Wasi. This sets up regular and 
obligatory exchanges between partners, between agricultural tribes on the one hand 
and maritime tribes on the other. The agricultural partner places produce in front of 
the house of his fisherman associate. The latter, after a great fishing expedition, makes 
return with interest, giving his partner in the agricultural village the product of  
his catch.”30 
It is quite obvious that these mutual gifts are based on gains from specializa-
tion and differences in availability. There exist a broad range of other exchange 
facilitating institutions such as the Kwakiutl Potlatch in the American 
Northwest, the Manus of the Great Admiralty Islands, the Tolowa-Tututni of 
California, or the Pokot of Kenya to name only a few. Descriptions and anal-
yses of these exchange facilitating gift ceremonies can be found in Mauss 
(1925/1967), Polanyi, Arensberg & Pearson (1957), Belshaw (1965) or Sahlins 
(1965). All these institutions share some common features as Belshaw  
demonstrated:  
“Although the details vary considerably from culture to culture, the main variables are 
remarkably constant. These include emphasis on relationships between individuals 
                                                     
28 Landa (1994), 143. 
29 See also Posner (1980). 
30 Mauss (1925/1967), 27. 
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which are also seen as relationships between groups. (...) A very high proportion of 
social contacts between adults is accompanied by gift-giving.”31 
To summarize, in early human history and in archaic societies trade has usually 
taken the form of gift exchange and was based on the principle of delayed reci-
procity. Exchange relations in these societies have been highly personalized 
and very stable. As Malinowski (1922/1953) reports, Kula relations were even 
passed on to heirs, so the reputation of a so called “Big Man” in the Kula Ring 
did not die with him. That way the last period problem of finite games is 
avoided, and the Kula gift exchange becomes an infinitely often repeated 
game. Furthermore, as Ziegler (1990) pointed out, trust played an essential 
role in Kula relations. 
In a similar way, Geertz (1978, 1979) has analysed the institutional struc-
ture of the Moroccan bazaar economy. At a first glance, the bazaar might ap-
pear to come close to the classic spot transaction of the ideal market. However, 
as Geertz points out even on the bazaar continuing relations build the domi-
nant pattern. Posner (1980), therefore, compared the bazaar economy directly 
to primitive societies as he argued: “In primitive societies if you trade repeat-
edly with the same man he becomes your blood brother and you owe him the 
same duty of generous and fair dealing that you would owe a kinsman. This 
‘barter friendship’ resembles the pairing of buyers and sellers in bazaars that 
Geertz noted. It is a way of bringing reciprocity into the exchange process and 
thereby increasing the likelihood that promises will be honoured despite the 
absence of a public enforcement authority.” 
Fafchamps (2002) made a similar observation referring to empirical evi-
dence of manufacturing and trading firms from Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. 
Personalized exchange is the rule in markets based on trust and reputation; 
commercial relationships between economic agents are long lasting. As Faf-
champs (2002) has explained, trust and reputation basically replace court based 
enforcement mechanisms in these societies. Therefore, as in the case of the 
Kula Ring, trade cannot be anonymous, but is based on mutual trust and the 
sharing of information among traders. The identity of the trading partners is of 
major importance. However, if screening devices are costly, some agents are 
                                                     
31 Belshaw (1965), 35.  
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excluded from the market, and the “business then becomes monopolized by a 
social network, possibly sharing the same ethnic or religious affiliation”.32  
Quite interestingly, the role of labels and identities for building trust has 
been also stressed by Landa (1994) to explain the dramatic success of ethnically 
homogeneous trading groups in many developing countries today, especially in 
South East Asia. She argued that ethnically homogeneous groups of middle-
men are “a low cost clublike institutional arrangements (...) which emerged to 
economize on contract enforcement and information costs in an environment 
where the legal infrastructure was not well developed.” These networks serve as 
an alternative to contract law or hierarchical structures. In these societies, eth-
nicity serves as a labelling device to signal credibility and to shape one’s  
expectations.33 
Furthermore, as Greif (1994) has shown, cultural beliefs may have a signifi-
cant impact on the overall economic outcome. In his comparative study of the 
Maghribi traders of the eleventh century and the Genoese traders of the twelfth 
century, Greif argues that the “collectivistic culture” of the Maghribi traders is 
an impediment to economic development while the individualistic culture of 
the Genoese fosters the development of markets and thereby also economic 
development. In a similar way, economists as Kuran (1997) and anthropolo-
gists as Ensminger (1997) have pointed to the labelling value of Islam in Afri-
ca. Membership of a certain religion shapes trading partners’ expectation about 
each other’s behavior, or to put it differently, certain religious beliefs are con-
nected with certain ethical codes of conduct, so traders know what to expect. 
As Kuran (1997) has argued, mutual trust between traders of the same religion 
is higher since they both have subscribed to the same religious beliefs. Hence, 
fewer safeguards are required and, accordingly, transaction costs are lower.  
Viewed from this angle, it is not very surprising that in history trade has 
often been in the hands of specific ethnic groups or even families such as the 
Lombard and Genoese merchants in medieval Europe, Jews in the Mediterra-
nean, Armenian in the Middle East, or Chinese in Singapore today, Asians in 
East Africa, Lebanese in West Africa.34 After all, ethnicity and religion might 
                                                     
32 Fafchamps (2002), 4. 
33 Landa (1994). 
34 See Fafchamps (2000). 
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play a more important role for the emergence of markets and economic devel-
opment than has been recognized so far.  
However, market conditions have changed in the course of world history as 
the population has increased, products have become more complex and com-
munication and transport easier. As Salisbury argued, in this course trade can 
be characterized by a “sequence of ceremonial gifts, intercommunity barter, 
trading partnerships, and market place trade.”35 In a similar way, Belshaw 
(1965) distinguished between “traditional exchange” and “modern markets.” 
While market exchange is rather connected with standardized spot transac-
tions and legal enforcement mechanisms, traditional exchange is based on 
principle of reciprocity and mutual trust. This view is certainly influenced by 
Polanyi (1944), The Great Transformation, in which he understands economic 
and cultural development as a shift from an economy embedded in social rela-
tions to one of impersonal markets. 
The historical sequence from ceremonial gift exchange over simple barter 
trade to personalized trading relationships to anonymous markets, as character-
ized by Salisbury (1968), has partly been explained by Coase as follows:  
“When the facilities are scattered and owned by a vast number of people with very 
different interests (...) the establishment of a private legal system would be very diffi-
cult. Those operating in these markets have to depend, therefore, on the legal system 
of the State.”36  
Moreover, North (1981) in his theory of institutional change outlined the 
following sequence:  
- As long as societies are of small size (families, tribes, villages…) exchange 
can take place without formal institutions such as property rights, trade is 
guided and structured by informal rules, 
- If trade occurs over longer distances, institutions must be found to protect 
against opportunism (such as norms, measures and weights as well as mon-
ey as a medium of exchange), 
- Urbanization and globalization require further institutional developments 
to facilitate trade (protection of property rights, international arbitration, 
diverse screening and signaling mechanisms). 
                                                     
35 Salisbury (1968), 122. 
36 Coase (1988a), 10. 
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The underlying principle behind this mechanism might be explained as fol-
lows: As the population size increases and transportation becomes easier, it 
becomes more difficult to keep track of every member of a society. The proba-
bility to meet the same trader again decreases, so that incentives for opportun-
istic behavior increase. Therefore, over the course of history different enforce-
ment mechanisms and exchange facilitating institutions arose. As Coase noted, 
in the medieval ages the provision of markets became an entrepreneurial activi-
ty: “In the medieval period in England, fairs and markets were organized by 
individuals under a franchise from the King. They not only provided the phys-
ical facilities for the fair or market but were also responsible for security (im-
portant in such unsettled times with a relatively weak government) and ad-
ministered a court for settling disputes (the court of piepowder).”37 These mar-
ket institutions, which usually consist of physical facilities such as the market 
place and an enforcement mechanism that might be called the market order, 
have to be built and maintained. 
Exactly in this sense, Milgrom, North and Weingast (1990) have discussed 
the institution of the medieval law merchant the role of whom was to provide 
information to make self-enforcing agreements feasible. Similarly, Greif, 
Milgrom and Weingast (1994) have analyzed medieval merchant guilds as 
exchange facilitating institutions that economize on transaction costs under 
conditions of legal uncertainty. As Gambetta (1993) has argued, from a histor-
ical point of view even the rise of the Sicilian Mafia can be explained on trans-
action cost grounds. According to Gambetta (1993), the Mafia historically 
basically provided an enforcement mechanism to facilitate trade. 
Fafchamps in his paper on “spontaneous” market emergence has summa-
rized all this nicely as follows:  
“To simplify a bit, early markets can be described as a two-tier system, with a core of 
sophisticated firms and traders and a fringe of small enterprises. Fringe agents operate 
on a purely cash-and-carry basis, largely in an anonymous fashion, and leave no room 
to breach of contract.38  
                                                     
37 Coase (1988a), 8. 
38 Fafchamps (2002); see Fafchamps/Minten (2001); for Vietnam in particular: McMil-
lan/Woodruff (1999a), (1999b). 
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Core agents are in long-term relationships with each other. They offer supplier 
credit and warranty and place orders.39 The widespread existence of long term 
relationships between manufacturers and their suppliers and clients has, for 
instance, been noted in developed and developing economies alike.40 Research 
by anthropologists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, and economists 
has shown that reliance on interpersonal relations at early stages of market 
development is nearly universal.41  
Hence, the emergence of markets and market economies does not necessari-
ly require efficient and costlessly working court based enforcement mecha-
nisms as is often suggested or assumed in economic theory. In the absence of a 
state that enforces property rights with coercive power other institutions 
might arise to facilitate exchange. It is important to notice, however, that in 
the absence of court based enforcement systems, markets cannot function as 
anonymous gatherings, but identity of the trading partners becomes highly 
relevant. As Coleman (1991) explained, social mechanisms such as gossip 
might serve a valuable function in these markets.  
Having now documented that markets can even work in the absence of 
well-defined property rights and the rule of law (as also black markets vividly 
demonstrate), it is also clear that well-defined property rights and the rule of 
law greatly simplify trade and market exchange, thereby simplifying both 
further specialization and credit-based relationships. In fact, the emergence of 
many platform markets in the digital economy is rather similar to the organi-
zation of historical markets in the medieval age. The provision of standard laws 
and enforcement mechanisms has greatly simplified exchange so that more 
transactions can actually take place and resources that were used to safeguard 
transactions can be saved. 
  
                                                     
39 See Fafchamps (1997). 
40 E.g. Lorenz (1988); Aoki (1988); Dore (1987); Fukuyama (1995); Stone/Levy/ 
Paredes (1992). 
41 E.g. Hopkins (1973); Greif (1993); North (1990); Meillassoux (1971); Amselle 
(1977); Jones (1959); Bauer (1954); Sahlins (1972). 
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Modern Markets and their Institutional and Informational  
Requirements 
In modern societies, business relations are usually based on explicit contracts 
which can be enforced by the state. With the development of the legal system 
and court based enforcement mechanisms trade in large, anonymous markets 
has become possible in principle.42 Indeed, standard economic theory normally 
assumes that in modern societies all trade takes the form of spot transactions 
and impersonal exchange. Examples often used to illustrate the point are 
commodity and stock exchanges. It is important to notice, however, that anon-
ymous price-making markets demand strong institutional and informational 
requirements. 
The Role of the Institutional Environment 
Regarding institutional requirements, only the development of the modern 
legal system has made possible the wide-spread emergence of price-making 
markets. Key to the emergence of modern markets are well-defined, stable and 
secure property rights, which are protected either by private order or by the 
Government or the state. According to the economic property rights theory, a 
property right in an asset consists of: 
- the right to use the asset,  
- the right to change its form and substance,  
- the right to appropriate the returns from the asset, and  
- the right to transfer (sell) all rights in the asset.43 
Exchange can most easily occur if it is clearly defined who holds the property 
right in an asset in the above sense.44 If there are no clearly defined property 
rights (including the right to use and to transfer an asset), markets are not 
likely to come into existence. Lack of clearly defined property rights does not 
                                                     
42 One may therefore argue that traditional (private) enforcement mechanisms, trust 
and reciprocity have become less important in modern markets when compared to 
traditional forms of exchange (see Belshaw, 1965). This is quite different in less de-
veloped peasant societies though. See Ensminger (1992); and Fafchamps (2000), 
(2001), for further description and analysis. 
43 See Furubotn/Pejovich (1972). 
44 See Coase (1960). 
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necessarily mean that markets will not emerge at all (see black markets), but it 
is much more difficult to create them and to ensure they work properly. 
Since it is costly to invest into the creation of a market, understood as the 
market facilities plus a market order and its enforcement, it is important that 
property rights are stable and secure and can be enforced through the courts or 
some other institution. If property rights are not stable and can be redefined 
relatively easily through other means (from theft or outright expropriation to 
Government regulation, which usually limits the right to use and/or change an 
asset), people will be less interested in trading these assets under uncertain 
conditions. Put differently, if people do not know what exactly it is they buy 
they will be less inclined to buy that particular asset. Also, it may be easier for 
them to lobby the Government to redefine property rights rather than buying 
the asset themselves and than change its use or form. If it is less costly for in-
dividuals to get the Government to redefine property rights rather than buy-
ing the asset themselves, it is risky to invest into the creation of a market.  
Hence, for markets to work best, property rights should be defined as clear-
ly as possible and be as stable and secure as possible. For the latter point, a 
judgement has to be made about how likely it is that the Government will 
intervene and redefine property rights. This in turn is dependent on a number 
of factors. First of all, one can ask whether private property rights are protected 
through a jurisdiction’s constitution as it is the case in the US or Germany or 
through other legal means or not at all. The question is: How easy is it for the 
Government or other parties to limit or restrict private property rights?  
Secondly, property rights are less likely to be guaranteed and stable if a giv-
en property rights allocation is not socially sustainable and acceptable for a 
majority of society. In this case, if a property rights allocation is not socially 
acceptable for a majority of voters, it is unlikely that this particular property 
rights allocation is politically sustainable either. Instead, the Government will 
have every incentive to redefine property rights through political/legal means. 
For example, the extent and type of taxation will typically also depend on de-
mographic features of the electorate.45 
Similar problems often occur with environmental issues when property 
rights in nature/natural resources are involved. While for example a market for 
water abstraction rights cannot exist without well defined property rights in 
                                                     
45 See, Scheuer/Wolitzky (2016). 
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the respective water resource, a market for water rights may not be acceptable 
for a majority of voters and therefore not politically viable even though eco-
nomic theory would predict a market for water rights to be an efficient mode 
of organisation. Another case are school vouchers where a market solution is 
predicted to be efficient from an economic perspective, but does not appear to 
be politically acceptable in many parts of the world. Hence, part from econom-
ic efficiency the political sustainability of any allocation of property rights 
needs to be considered.46 
Information and Transaction Costs 
While stable and well defined property rights are key to the creation and 
smooth working of markets, they alone do not suffice to make markets work 
best (as opposed to other mechanisms of exchange such as social networks or 
hierarchies). Put differently, the existence of secure property rights is only a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for markets to come into existence. In 
fact, price-making markets not only require well-defined and enforceable prop-
erty rights, but in addition “it must be possible to measure the dimensions of a 
good or service” (North 1981, 42).  
Information Issues 
For purely price intermediated trade to take place it is not sufficient that prop-
erty rights are well defined, but there are also strong informational require-
ments for the functioning of the price mechanism. Already Stigler (1961) in 
his seminal article on the economics of information has pointed out that in-
formation is not for free and that potential buyers have to invest in gathering 
information to find out where they can buy what at which price. Similarly, 
sellers have to find out what it is that buyers actually demand. This infor-
mation gathering and processing takes up time and other resources. Price-
making markets can only work smoothly if this information is easily and wide-
ly accessible for both potential buyers and potential sellers.47 
  
                                                     
46 See Dixit (1996); Williamson (1996); Acemoglu/Robinson (2013). 
47 A more formal model which looks at buyers’ and sellers’ incentives to invest into 
information gathering has been provided by Gould (1980). 
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Quality Uncertainty 
What is as crucial for the working of a market as information about a product’s 
price and place etc is, in many cases, information about product quality, which 
can be much more difficult to convey. George Akerlof has demonstrated this 
quite plastically in his seminal paper on the “Market for Lemons” (Akerlof, 
1970), where he shows that trading on the market for used cars may break 
down because buyers have inferior information about the quality of a used car 
than sellers. If buyers lack trust in sellers’ promises, markets are very difficult 
to establish. This is because with lack of trust buyers will “deduct” a risk pre-
mium from the price they are willing to pay. Knowing this, owners of used 
cars will be less inclined to put a “good” used car on the market, which again 
leads to a deterioration of the average quality of used cars traded on the market 
which again confirms’ buyers’ suspicions that only “lemons” are offered. 
For many products price is only one among many factors that buyers con-
sider before making their purchase decision. Apart from the price, a product’s 
quality (in the broadest sense of the word) and associated services are often as 
important as the product’s price. However, for many goods and services buyers 
cannot evaluate the product’s true quality ex ante, or it is rather costly for 
them to do so. Here the economics literature distinguishes between search 
qualities, experience qualities and credence qualities.48  
Search qualities are those characteristics of a good that buyers can easily de-
termine before purchase such as colour or size. In contrast, experience qualities 
are characteristics that buyers only learn after purchase, e.g. a good’s durability 
or actual taste. That is, these qualities can only be determined though experi-
ence, but not through simple inspection. Credence qualities are finally those 
qualities which are even costly to determine after purchase. Examples are the 
quality of a car repair or medical services where most buyers do not know even 
after purchase whether they received the quality and extent of treatment that 
was best for them. Hence, information problems are severest for goods where 
credence qualities are important while informational aspects are the least im-
portant for search goods where most information can be gained through simple 
inspection.  
                                                     
48 The distinction between search and experience qualities has been introduced by 
Nelson (1970). Darby/Karni (1973) later added the credence good category. 
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For credence and experience goods trust between buyers and sellers is deci-
sive for a successful trading relationship. Hence, it is much more difficult to 
establish anonymous markets for experience or credence goods where sellers 
and buyers remain anonymous. In fact, most organised markets concentrate in 
the trade of highly standardised search goods where buyers and sellers have 
high degrees of certainty about the goods’ quality.  
Information and measurement costs can be reduced, however, through 
standardisation and classification procedures.49 Through means of standardisa-
tion and classification experience qualities can be transformed into search qual-
ities, at least to some degree. Reference standards make it easier to “measure” 
product quality, thereby reducing information costs. Also, if the numbers of 
traders is relatively small, training buyers and sellers may help overcoming the 
informational problems associated with quality uncertainty if training enables 
market participants to judge quality more accurately before purchase. 
In general, however, it is least complicated to establish markets for search 
goods where quality is easy to determine and to describe. For experience goods, 
other trust building mechanisms have to be used such as guarantees, invest-
ment in branding,50 or external reference systems (such as the reputation and 
information exchange systems on most online platforms where buyers and 
sellers can exchange information about their experience with other buyers and 
sellers).  
When do Markets Work Best? 
According to economic theory transactions are, all other things equal, organ-
ised in a way to minimise the sum of transaction and production costs. Hence, 
anonymous markets are usually replaced by other contractual arrangements as 
the contractual hazards that arise from asset specificity, uncertainty and low 
frequency of transaction increase. This is reflected in the work of North who 
writes: “Small numbers involved in exchange, the possibility of opportunism, 
and uncertainty as a result of a lack of well-defined property rights or an ina-
bility to forecast changes in conditions over the life of an exchange agreement 
all result in alternative contractual arrangements designed to reduce the at-
                                                     
49 See Barzel (1982), (1985). 
50 See Klein/Leffler (1981). 
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tendant transaction or production costs.”51 However, given that it is costly to 
organise markets, the perspective can also be turned around: Price-making 
markets (using standardised contracts) do not evolve as long as the strong in-
stitutional and informational requirements are not met. Highly personalised 
exchange relations will prevail instead. 
Not surprisingly, the strong informational and institutional conditions 
necessary for impersonal exchange are almost only met in highly organised 
markets such as stock or commodity exchanges or some auctions. As 
Telser/Higinbotham explain, “in an organised market the participants trade a 
standardised contract such that each unit of the contract is a perfect substitute 
for any other unit. The identities of the parties in any mutually agreeable 
transaction do not affect the terms of exchange. The organised market itself or 
some other institution deliberately creates a homogeneous good that can be 
traded anonymously by the participants or their agents.”52 
Stock or commodity exchanges as well as auctions are usually explicitly or-
ganised by a club of traders or a firm which usually owns the physical facilities 
within which trade takes place. Moreover, the dimensions of the transactions 
such as the trading place and time are usually regulated by an underlying mar-
ket constitution. Goods as well as traders have to be admitted to the exchange, 
and entry to the market is limited. Through these measures measurement costs 
and credibility problems can be reduced. A high degree of product standardisa-
tion and classification allows traders to use standardised contracts and proce-
dures and reduces measurement and bargaining costs. Hence, key for anony-
mous, impersonal exchange is a high degree of product standardisation or clas-
sification which allows the use of highly standardised contracts. In organised 
markets, traders usually also have to pay a fee to use the market facilities. Since 
entry is limited and traders pay for the use of the market, organised markets 
can also be regarded as clubs. The exclusion of traders from the stock market 
serves to prevent free riding on the information costly generated in the  
market.53 
As long as there are relatively few traders the market can still be explicitly 
and centrally organised as, for example, the New York Diamond Dealers’ Club 
                                                     
51 North (1981), 42. 
52 Telser/Higinbotham (1977), 997. 
53 For a further analysis see Telser & Higinbotham (1977) and Telser (1981). 
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the organisation of which has been analysed by Bernstein (1992, 1996). Ac-
cording to her analysis the sophisticated rules and codes of conduct of the dia-
mond industry guarantee that trade is organised in a transaction cost efficient 
manner. Disputes are hardly ever settled by courts, but rather by market arbi-
tration. Furthermore, reputation plays an enormous role in the diamond indus-
try and serves as a bond to guarantee contractual performance. However, as 
Coase explains, 
“when the facilities are scattered and owned by a vast number of people with very 
different interests (...) the establishment of a private legal system would be very diffi-
cult. Those operating in these markets have to depend, therefore, on the legal system 
of the State.”54  
Unfortunately, there is no clear indicator or rule of thumb what constitutes 
large numbers and small numbers or high and low transaction costs. One of 
the few academic economists who have specialised in the analysis of organised 
markets, Dennis Carlton, points out in his analysis of organised futures mar-
kets, that while it is possible  
“to identify some important characteristics that make a commodity suitable for a fu-
tures market, it is extremely difficult to predict which futures markets will  
succeed.”55 
Finally, even in markets for highly standardised and measurable goods rela-
tionships between traders seem to play an important role. As Baker (1984) 
reports in his empirical study of floor trading of stock options, price volatility 
strongly increased with the number of trading groups. Granovetter (1992) 
explains these findings on grounds of the number of relations the average trad-
er can sustain, relatively to the total number of traders. With a growing num-
ber of traders the market becomes more fragmented, the information flow 
becomes slower, and convergence to a single equilibrium more problematic. 
                                                     
54 See Coase (1988a), 10. Nevertheless, court enforcement of contracts is rather an 
exception than the rule as Macaulay (1963) has observed. In a similar way, Bernstein 
(1996) argues that explicit contracts rather serve as a benchmark for the case that a 
relationship breaks down than as an agreement of how to proceed while the contrac-
tual relationship is still continuing. 
55 Carlton (1981), 244. 
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The Rule of Law Facilitates Market Exchange 
As mentioned above, when property rights are well-defined, safe and secure, 
modern markets can most easily emerge. The extent of a given property right 
depends on (a) the contracts that have been concluded, and (b) the institutional 
environment that is in place. The institutional environment encompasses the 
definition and enforcement of property rights, which determine the transac-
tions costs of and the gains from doing business. 
A fundamental problem with the definition and enforcement of property 
rights is what has been called the “paradox of the strong state” by Barry 
Weingast (1995):  
“The fundamental political dilemma of an economic system is this: A government 
strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to 
confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” 
The problem, then, is how to empower government to subdue predators with-
out letting it become an instrument of predation itself. How can one design an 
institutional environment that gives government the power to protect property 
rights while at the same time prevents government from using this power to 
curb property rights? How is it possible to simultaneously empower and con-
strain government? How can this paradox be solved?  
Given that government has the ability to do good (enforce property rights) 
and bad (destroy property rights), how do we give government agents the in-
centive to do good and avoid bad? One solution proposed by constitutional 
political economists are constitutional constraints. Federalism, separation of 
powers, and the rule of law can structure government power in such a way as to 
limit how that power can be used. Another option can lie in the signature of 
international treaties and entry into international organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which implies a commitment to free trade. 
More generally speaking, the law and regulations surrounding business ac-
tivities should pursue, broad speaking, two objectives. On the one hand, con-
sumers need protection against any producers’ market power, but on the other 
hand investors also need to be protected against expropriation (hold-up) 
through the Government. Accordingly, regulation may be interpreted as an 
implicit contract between producers and consumers, which is administered by 
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an (impartial) regulatory authority.56 Every regulatory system is – necessarily – 
compromised with two types or errors, though. Firstly, regulation or govern-
ment intervention can occur even though it is not necessary or beneficial (type-
I- error), while, secondly, regulation or government intervention may not be in 
place even though it would have been beneficial (type-II-error). To find the 
optimal balance between these two errors is the difficult task of designing 
good regulatory systems to govern market exchange. 
An optimal regulatory system should aim at achieving a balance between 
the following five objectives: (1) preventing the abuse of market power (alloca-
tive efficiency), (2) ensuring cost minimising production (productive efficien-
cy), (3) facilitating optimal investment over time (dynamic efficiency), (4) 
inducing minimal transactions costs (transactions costs efficiency), and (5) 
providing minimal incentives for lobbying and unproductive rent-seeking 
(political efficiency). Of course, trade-offs are unavoidable, and in addition 
there are different political objectives for different industries. In order to facili-
tate investment, however, investor protection is necessary. The problem is 
especially difficult to solve if (i) investments are highly location specific, and 
(ii) investors are foreigners (who do not vote) and are easier to expropriate from 
a political-economy perspective. 
Potential solutions include the international rule of law, the signature of in-
ternational investment protection treaties and accepting “global governance” 
mechanisms. After all, the division of labor (which is responsible for our eco-
nomic well-being) is limited by the extent of the market, as Adam Smith has 
said long ago, but the extent of the market is also limited by the extent of the 
law, as George Stigler has added. Hence, the extent of the law also affects eco-
nomic growth and prosperity. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Summarising the analysis above, whether markets work better than other 
forms of exchange depends on the institutional environment, informational 
aspects and the dimensions of the transaction. In general, an organised market 
can only flourish if the transaction costs of exchange are lower on the market 
                                                     
56 See Goldberg (1976). 
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than they would be under any other mode of organisation. If transactions costs 
are lower within a different mode of organisation, e.g. within long-term bilat-
eral contracts, the market is unlikely to survive.  
First of all, for markets to emerge property rights in the asset to be traded 
have to be well defined and should be as stable and secure as possible. How 
stable property rights are is not only a strictly legal question (whether property 
rights are legally protected and enforceable), but usually also a political ques-
tion. If a property rights allocation is not acceptable to larger parts of society 
for whatever reason, the Government faces incentives to restrict or redefine 
property rights. The risk of (creeping) expropriation makes it more difficult to 
set up and operate organised markets. For example, before investing into the 
establishment of a market for tradable water rights, there needs to be some 
degree of certainty that these property rights will not be redefined and the 
market shut. Whether the creation of a market for some good or service is 
socially acceptable and therefore politically viable obviously depends on the 
particular circumstances. The key questions are whether property rights are 
well defined and expected to remain stable and whether the establishment of a 
market for the good or service is likely to be politically viable. 
A fundamental problem with the definition and enforcement of property 
rights is what has been called the “paradox of the strong state” (Weingast, 
1995):  
“The fundamental political dilemma of an economic system is this: A government 
strong enough to protect property rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to 
confiscate the wealth of its citizens.” 
The problem, then, is how to empower government to subdue predators with-
out letting it become an instrument of predation itself. How can one design an 
institutional environment that gives government the power to protect property 
rights while at the same time prevents government from using this power to 
curb property rights? Given that government has the ability to do good (en-
force property rights) and bad (destroy property rights), how do we give gov-
ernment agents the incentive to do good and avoid bad?  
One solution proposed by constitutional political economists are constitu-
tional constraints. Federalism, separation of powers, and the rule of law can 
structure government power in such a way as to limit how that power can be 
used. Another option can lie in the signature of international treaties and entry 
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into international organizations such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), which implies a commitment to free trade. 
More generally speaking, the law and regulations surrounding business ac-
tivities should pursue, broad speaking, two objectives. On the one hand, con-
sumers need protection against any producers’ market power, but on the other 
hand investors also need to be protected against expropriation (hold-up) 
through the Government. Accordingly, regulation may be interpreted as an 
implicit contract between producers and consumers, which is administered by 
an (impartial) regulatory authority.57 Every regulatory system is – necessarily – 
compromised with two types or errors, though. Firstly, regulation or govern-
ment intervention can occur even though it is not necessary or beneficial (type-
I- error), while, secondly, regulation or government intervention may not be in 
place even though it would have been beneficial (type-II-error). To find the 
optimal balance between these two errors is the difficult task of designing 
good regulatory systems to govern market exchange. 
An optimal regulatory system should aim at achieving a balance between 
the following five objectives: 
- preventing the abuse of market power (allocative efficiency),  
- ensuring cost minimising production (productive efficiency),  
- facilitating optimal investment over time (dynamic efficiency),  
- inducing minimal transactions costs (transactions costs efficiency), and 
- providing minimal incentives for lobbying and unproductive rent-seeking 
(political efficiency).  
Of course, trade-offs are unavoidable, and in addition there are different politi-
cal objectives for different industries. 
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